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“We are in a political laboratory; never blame us if we make mistakes, we are [just] learning.” 
 –Julius Malema1 
 
Before Jacob Zuma’s election in 2009, Julius Sello Malema was a virtually unknown 
figure in South African politics. After the general elections in April of that year, Julius Malema 
became a household name. As President of the African National Congress Youth League 
(ANCYL), Malema has become one of the most contentious and ridiculed figures in South 
African political history. Malema’s rise to fame has been swift; his outspoken commentary on 
the African National Congress (ANC) as well as his merciless prodding of previously taboo South 
African issues such as land reform and nationalization has brought him domestic and 
international attention. 
 Malema is certainly a surprising addition to the South African political landscape 
because of his arguably untested and uneducated background as well as his affiliation with an 
ethnic minority. The leader of the ANC’s Youth League claims to represent everyday South 
Africans in his rhetoric and in his proposed polices for South Africa. His swift rise to political 
fame raises many questions—did Malema arise out of a vacuum of leadership and service 
delivery in the ANC? Is Malema responsible for creating a movement, or is he simply a product 
of the dissatisfaction of the South African people? How did the ANC’s “running dog” turn 
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against the President that he helped to elect?2 How are his actions and words affecting South 
Africa’s standing in the world? And most importantly: What can we learn about populist politics 
and the political atmosphere in South Africa through Malema?  
 As will be explored in depth in the first chapter, a vacuum of leadership within the ANC 
has been critical to Malema’s rise, this vacuum of leadership became visible at the ANC’s 2007 
Polokwane Conference, when Jacob Zuma openly challenged Thabo Mbeki for leadership of the 
ANC. Zuma later succeeded Mbeki as Secretary General of the ANC, and was subsequently 
elected President of South Africa. Prior to this shift, the ANC was seen by most of the world as a 
unified party; the ANC now contains various clashing factions and members who are not afraid 
to speak publicly about how and by whom they think the party should be run. This shift in the 
comportment of the ANC has enabled Malema and his followers to speak out against policy and 
to create a political undercurrent that has grown in strength against Jacob Zuma and could 
possibly topple him.   
 Service delivery, or more accurately, service non-delivery, is an important segment of 
the social climate to consider when examining post-apartheid South Africa. My argument is that 
young and poor black South Africans make up the majority of the country’s population—and 
the ANC’s constituency--and they are not being actively integrated into South Africa’s economy 
quickly or efficiently because of current domestic policies. Millions are living in shacks on the 
outskirts of South African cities with little to no access to infrastructure such as plumbing or 
electricity. Other issues, such as poor education, the lack of jobs and the very large gap 
between the haves and have-nots has created resentment and anger among the poorest in the 
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country. Malema both contributes to tensions by addressing the concerns of the poor with his 
compelling speeches and by being outspoken in addressing these concerns via the media.  
 In the third chapter, I argue that the issue of a generational divide also helps to explain 
Malema’s rise to prominence. As head of the ANCYL, it is Malema’s job to represent the youth 
of South Africa. Those who did not experience Apartheid, or who were too young to actually 
see how it affected the country may not appreciate the ANC’s history as ‘liberators’ and 
‘freedom fighters’ as much as previous generations. The youth of South Africa are dissatisfied 
with the way things stand, and they do not have memories of the past as a reference point for 
how bad some forms of governance can truly be—these youths are simply exasperated with 
the ANC’s current mode of running the country. Malema is responsible for expressing the views 
of his peers: the view that the ANC should be held accountable for the state of the country and 
prodded into the “right” policies for the majority of South Africans.  
 The vacuum of leadership within the ANC, the issues of service delivery to the poor, and 
the dissatisfaction and unrest amongst the youngest members of South African society are the 
major factors that have contributed to the political problems that President Zuma now faces; 
these problems are personified in Julius Malema.  
  After a detailed analysis of the three reasons behind South Africa’s unrest as well as a 
look at the ANCYL, evidence of Malema’s rise to power will be explored and analyzed further in 
the fourth chapter entitled “The Rise of Julius Malema.” Firstly, Malema’s modest past and the 
shaping of his personality will be highlighted in a short biographical section. Secondly, 
Malema’s role as a dedicated member and promoter of the ANC will be examined via public 
accounts of Malema’s actions, such as transcripts from speeches, media reports, as well as first-
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hand video accounts. Thirdly, Malema’s actions of speaking out against the perceived 
capitalistic tendencies of the ANC and other powerful South Africans, and his desires of 
nationalization and land reform need to be addressed. After the accusations of hate speech and 
stirring up the previously ignored issues of land redistribution and the nationalization of mines, 
Malema was most recently accused of living beyond his ANCYL salary and inquiries have been 
made to trace Malema’s method of supporting himself so luxuriously.3 This is ironic, since he 
has previously accused many members of the ANC as well as other South African public figures 
of corruption. Finally, current events surrounding Malema’s potential expulsion from the ANC 
as well as his continued political potential must be analyzed.  
 Finally, an exploration of Malema’s perceived ‘success’ is needed in order to illustrate 
whether or not Malema is a true contender for power in South African politics. The implications 
of Malema’s power will be explained in depth at the end of this introduction and in the final 
chapter. For my purposes, Malema’s success will be defined as the amount of positive change 
or attention he has achieved for his constituency (poor South Africans) since his rise. This 
approach has flaws because his presence does not necessarily create change, nor does he 
currently have any power to make policy corrections in South Africa. I understand this, but the 
media attention that Malema brings to the issues pressures the ANC to perform well, as does 
the small backsliding the party experienced during local elections in 2010. To illustrate 
Malema’s success according to my established definition, I will use primary documents from the 
ANCYL, as well as public reactions from the ANC. Public opinion is also very important in 
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measuring Malema’s growth, and I will use targeted interviews of my contacts in South Africa to 
achieve this. Unfortunately, this also has flaws, because those that I will be able to contact 
come from educated backgrounds, and that can interfere with the presentation of Malema’s 
perceived persona.  
 In my conclusion, I will explore Malema’s future. There are many that fear that Malema 
will gain power within the ANC, and perhaps be elected to run the country someday. His 
references to the nationalizations of mines and land reform would certainly make many 
investors in South Africa’s private sector very nervous, and could potentially damage the 
country’s economy. His perceived racism and accusations of hate speech would cause the 
economically-powerful white minority to feel unsafe if he were in a leadership position.4 Small 
indications of these effects have already begun, and the ANC has scrambled to show the world 
that their policies do not agree with what Malema believes.5 I must argue that Malema is a 
young radical, and at one time, all leaders of the ANC were young radicals. If Nelson Mandela 
were given the Presidency of South Africa when he was the ANCYL President, his policies would 
have been different from what they were in 1994. Malema has already shown a leaning toward 
appreciating what private investment and the interests of the West could bring to the country 
and his own private wealth. Thus, Malema conceivably is no threat to the security of South 
Africa; he merely draws attention to policy issues that need to be resolved or amended. 
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Although no one can see into the future, I would confidently say that if Malema were to gain 
significant power, he would not become another Robert Mugabe, but instead, he would 
become another Jacob Zuma.  
 
Literature Review: Politics of the ANC and the Entry of Julius Malema 
A broad literature on the ANC and its role in South African Politics exists. My work 
contributes to the literature by critiquing and analyzing the leadership dynamics within the 
political party. My methodological approach to the study includes examining diverse primary 
sources. These primary documents include records of ANC conference and through 
conversations with scholars in the United States and South Africa who specialize in South 
African politics. I supplemented these primary sources with monographs, newspaper articles, 
and informal interviews. 
            The topic and subject matter of this study is current and in-progress. Many of the writers 
of my sources are academics, journalists, and policy analysts. There are many examinations of 
Jacob Zuma’s rise to the Presidency of South Africa; the most significant sources were from Alec 
Russell: a South African news editor, Zwelethu Jolobe: a political science professor who 
mentored me with at the University of Cape Town, Andrew Feinstein: a former ANC member, 
and Tom Lodge: a professor specializing in South African Politics at the University of Limerick. 
These scholars' contributions to the body of knowledge surrounding the ANC before and during 
the election of Jacob Zuma as well as the analysis of the significance of those actions is very 
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important in understanding the subject matter.6 These men’s work certainly stands as an 
inspiration and a framework for this piece. Alec Russell takes a journalistic approach, outlining 
the events in the 2007 election as they happened, and also added his own opinions of Zuma 
which were based on past interactions with the politician. Zwelethu Jolobe works primarily as a 
political analyst, and his work examines the impacts and implications that the election process 
holds for the ANC. Andrew Feinstein has an insider’s detailed knowledge, and he analyzes small 
details of the ANC’s decision making behind closed doors. Tom Lodge takes an unbiased, 
academic approach, and offers more economic analysis into his writings on the politics of the 
ANC. 
            On the topic of service delivery, South African news correspondent R.W. Johnson’s 
insightful research and commentary helped to shape the qualitative information needed for 
this piece. Another journalist, David Goodman, and Professor Stephen Chan at SOAS also 
contributed to the body of knowledge surrounding the history and current events concerning 
South African service delivery.7 For my statistical data in the chapter, David McDonald and John 
Pape’s work Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in South Africa was incredibly in-
depth, and provided the majority of my data as well as the inspiration for the definition of 
service delivery itself.  
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            For historical grounding and theoretical background concerning Apartheid, Leonard 
Thompson’s History of South Africa was incredibly helpful, as was Julian Kunnie’s modern 
insights in Is Apartheid Really Dead?  
            As for contemporary sources, BBC News, Mail & Guardian South Africa, The New York 
Times, and The Economist were all trustworthy and timely sources. One of the most works to 
this piece was Fiona Ford’s book, An Inconvenient Youth: Julius Malema and the ‘New’ ANC. This 
book is critical because the author spent a year in close confidence with Julius Malema and had 
many interviews with the politician. Luckily, this book was published at the end of 2011 with an 
important foreword by South African-Based theorist, Achille Mbembe. I also followed new 
technologies to further extrapolate examples of Malema’s views and speeches, such as twitter 
and Malema’s personal blog. This type of referencing adds an edge to the work, keeping it up to 
date and integrating Malema’s voice into the story.  
            These works are all crucial in reporting the facts about the rising dissatisfaction in South 
Africa as well as the characteristics of Julius Malema’s political potential in the country. This 
work is unique in that it brings together the facts from academic discourse and new sources in 
its analysis. My approach to this work was to include Malema’s voice, which I felt had not yet 
been properly heard in the realm of academic discourse.  While researching this piece and it 
was my hope that one of the foremost researchers on the ANC would publish something on the 
rise of Malema, but this has yet to happen. Interestingly enough, the typical academic 
observers and commentators on South African politics have remained silent on the topic of 
Julius Malema. This is probably because Malema’s future is highly unpredictable; he could be a 
potentially powerful figure in South African politics or a short-lived political celebrity. To many 
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scholars, it is not yet apparent whether or not Malema will continue to be a household name, 
or if he will be forgotten by his followers and the press. Malema is an important figure in South 
African politics because of the support he holds with the people and because of his intelligence 
in manipulating the media.  
 This piece is not merely political commentary on recent events in South African politics. 
This piece is about a man who overcame many struggles and became a leader for those who 
are like him. Malema is a man who appears to want tangible change for all South Africans, 
something that was promised once before but has yet to surface. For now, it does not matter 
whether or not Malema is personally successful with his movement, what matters is that he 
inspires people to come together to express their frustration, to talk about what was previously 
taboo. Malema himself is a barometer of the attitudes of everyday South Africans, and for that 











Chapter One: “A Vacuum of Leadership” 
 
 In 2007, the African National Congress experienced a historical political shift involving 
then-President Thabo Mbeki and Deputy President Jacob Zuma. The dramatic election of Jacob 
Zuma and the removal of Thabo Mbeki began a crisis for the leadership of the ANC that will 
affect the party’s politics for years to come.  
The roots of this crisis began with Mbeki’s economic policies that were perceived to 
favor the elites of the country by building trade with the West and by employing a market-
based approach to domestic spending that did not allow for governmental development in the 
poorest areas of South Africa. Instead, the policy pushed for macroeconomic growth and for 
austerity in municipal and local spending. It did not help that Mbeki himself seemed oblivious 
to the expectations of the country’s poor black majority.1 The expectations of the black South 
African majority were that the country’s new economic growth of over five percent (stemming 
from the new economic policy) would trickle down and help the poor become a functioning 
part of the economy.2 This “trickle-down effect” did not occur in Mbeki’s administration; the 
growing middle classes in South Africa, as well as corporate elites, made the most of this period 
of rapid economic expansion. The working class and the poor saw little to no growth. The 
majority of South Africans, left impoverished and uneducated by the structure of the previous 
Apartheid governmental system, did not encounter tangible positive economic growth in their 
communities. Instead, they were witness to a narrowing of opportunities and a growth of 
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poverty for the lower classes as a whole. This loss became a point of tension for poor South 
Africans—the group who happened to be the ANC’s largest constituency—and resentment 
grew against Mbeki.  
  After six years as president of the country and of the ANC, Mbeki faced a rebellion 
within the party led by Jacob Zuma, his former deputy president.3 Heroic Zuma emerged in 
contrast to the commonly vilified version of Mbeki; Zuma is a Zulu who grew up in poverty, and 
constituents saw him as a warm, patriotic figure that would remember his roots when 
formulating and installing economic and domestic policies. Mbeki was educated abroad and 
lived a middle-class lifestyle throughout the brutal South African Apartheid, when many others 
were risking their lives for freedom and equality. Zuma emerged as the people’s candidate; he 
was a popular contender for the leadership of the country’s most powerful party. Because of 
Zuma’s popularity with the general populace and the obvious discontent with Mbeki’s policies, 
members of the ANC became increasingly split between the two candidates. Members began to 
take sides; they were on Zuma’s side or they were with Mbeki. This was a novelty for the ANC. 
There had not been conflict over party leadership since 1949, when Nelson Mandela and the 
ANC’s Youth League openly criticized the ANC’s because of a difference in ideology.4 This split 
of members over party member Zuma and party president Mbeki was the first of its kind; 
blatant campaigning and partisanship had never been seen in the ANC before Zuma laid claim 
to the party’s presidency.5 The battle between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki was a historic 
                                                 
3
 Alec Russel. Bring me my Machine Gun: The Battle for the soul of the ANC from Mandela to Zuma. (New York: 




 Zwelethu Jolobe. “The State of the ANC in 2008: The Anatomy of a Political Crisis.” Perspectives 5 (2009) 6-7 
3 
 
moment because it opened the doors for partisanship within the ANC, and built the 
mechanisms for challenging leadership within the party.  
 At the ANC’s 52nd National Conference in Polokwane, Limpopo in December 2007, Jacob 
Zuma was proclaimed the victor of the power struggle within the ANC and became the party’s 
president. The inner struggle had come to a head and the voting members ended the conflict 
with Zuma holding a majority of their votes. Mbeki and his followers were defeated and rather 
than falling away out of the spotlight, the group decided to form another political party called 
Congress of the People, or COPE.6 The founding of another party served to illustrate the large 
rift in the ANC in leadership for the public and the media to observe. Many members left the 
ANC to join COPE and to support Mbeki. COPE began to attract moderate South African voters 
from racial minorities who did not always lean as far to the left as the ANC traditionally had. 
COPE was seen as a threat to the ANC’s hegemony in the country because it recruited many of 
the ANC’s members and valuable donors.  
 Fortunately for the ANC, COPE did not become a permanent fixture in the South African 
political arena. COPE did not last long as a separate political party mainly because of 
irreconcilable differences within the leadership and because its platform was too similar to the 
ANC’s already established policies.7 The ANC did not lose many of its voters among the poor 
majority, nor did its two-thirds majority decrease significantly as a result of the split. The 
emergence of COPE is not the important lesson to take away from this section—it is the 
message that many in the ANC took away from the Polokwane Conference. The message was 
that partisan behavior was accepted in Polokwane by the ANC and was illustrated with great 







fanfare in the formation of COPE. Previously, the ANC had not been accepting of this sort of 
behavior; any sort of rift between members was quickly quieted and only discussed amongst 
party elites. The move to allow the inter-party politics of the ANC’s elite leadership to be seen 
and heard by its members and the general public has created a major problem for the current 
leadership of the ANC and its allied parties, and it will continue to do so into the near future.    
 
Tri-Partite Politics after Polokwane 
 The ANC has been traditionally allied with two groups: the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The groups were allies 
in the days of Apartheid and continued their relationship together very amicably during the 
reconstruction period after 1994 because they represented powerful interests within South 
Africa. COSATU represented the interests of labor unions; labor unions had been pivotal in 
hastening the end of Apartheid via strikes and as outlets to speak out against discrimination. 
The SACP was traditionally home to South African intellectuals and radicals who kept the post-
Apartheid government in touch with its radical leftist roots. Both of the groups were given 
equal say in the proceedings of the governing party through their elected leaders, who also 
held positions in the upper levels of the ANC.8 
 Both COSATU and the SACP were important contributors to the outcomes of Jacob 
Zuma’s election within the ANC, because both of these groups campaigned for Zuma within 
their memberships at the grassroots level. These groups believed that Zuma would follow a 
more “labor-friendly” and leftist agenda because of his personal history in contrast to Mbeki’s 
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and that is why they chose to back him as a candidate.9 Essentially, neither the SACP nor 
COSATU felt that Mbeki’s politics and policies suited their individual purposes, so they chose to 
join the Zuma faction and use their powers to see him elected as Secretary General of the ANC. 
With COSATU and the SACP backing him, Zuma created the left-populist alliance, which also 
included youth groups, NGOs and various religious organizations.10 With these pro-poor groups 
behind his candidacy, Zuma was seen as a pro-poor candidate. That carefully-crafted image 
certainly helped Zuma to win the votes of rank and file ANC members. If it were not for these 
influential groups Zuma would have had a much more difficult campaign and he would not have 
had the heavy expectations placed on his shoulders that he now has to contend with. 
 Unfortunately, Jacob Zuma did not turn out to be the President that his allies on the left 
had hoped he would be. One condition of Zuma gaining the Presidency was that there would be 
no major shifts of economic policy—this was decided by leadership within ANC.11For COSATU 
and the SACP, a change in economic policy had been what was desired, and although the 
groups had assisted in changing the ruling party’s leadership, they could have no impact on the 
country’s economic direction. This rift between what the allies thought should happen and 
what the ANC mandated in its policies would eventually cause trouble within the alliance. The 
expectations that these groups had for Zuma’s administration in contrast to Zuma’s realities 
were unsettling and caused many disagreements within the alliance. The conflicts that the 
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alliance would eventually face with Zuma stem from the unfulfilled promises that Zuma made 
to those who helped him win his place as leader of the ANC and President of South Africa.  
 The conflicts between Zuma’s administration, COSATU, and the SACP have been highly 
publicized unlike prior conflicts within the alliance before the Mbeki-Zuma power struggle. 
There is much literature on whether or not there will be a major split in the tri-partite alliance, 
and if COSATU will go on to start its own political party like COPE. The majority of experts wager 
that there will not be a split; the ANC is too powerful with its current two-thirds majority, and 
the SACP and COSATU know that. President Zuma knows that as well, which is why he does not 
seem pressured to appease these organizations that helped him before he was in power. 
Instead of splitting, these groups are forced to work from inside the alliance to create the 
change they desire. This is another reason that the pillars of leadership within the ANC have 
become so shaky; the forces that once unified the ANC and made it powerful are fighting 
against one another for distinct and separate policies. COSATU and the SACP were once 
members of a strong alliance of liberators and policymakers, but now they become a group that 
only holds the power to change the leadership of the ANC to someone who is more supportive 
of their voice. This desire of a different leader combined with the established precedent for 
partisanship within the party’s politics can only work negatively against Zuma and his 
supporters.  
Zuma as President 
 Zuma became President of The Republic of South Africa officially in 2009 after the ANC 
won the national elections with a two-thirds majority. As was previously mentioned, President 
Zuma’s administration felt no strong compulsion to change the economic policies that the 
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country followed. In reality, Zuma made big promises during his campaign to many politicians 
and businessmen in and out of the ANC, and these massive debts needed to be paid before he 
could focus on South Africa’s impoverished majority.12 Jacob Zuma is a charismatic politician 
who knows how to use popularity to his benefit, but he still needs support from those who 
control the country’s economy. Unfortunately, even if Zuma does have the best intentions for 
South Africa, he has to serve the interests of capitalism and the wealthy first, and the needs of 
poor black people second. This prioritization creates a vacuum of leadership for the poor 
majority that has become very dangerous, and could be filled by an equally charismatic and 
popular political entrepreneur, one that does not have the volatile past or the political debts 
that Jacob Zuma has to answer to.   
 Zuma’s has had a troubled political past; he was accused of rape and corruption long 
before he challenged Mbeki for the leadership of the ANC and assumed the South African 
Presidency. In November 2001, Schabir Shaik, a friend of Zuma’s, was arrested for corruption. 
Shaik was involved in a private French company’s arms deal with the South African 
government; the arms supplier had given gifts of luxury vehicles and cash to people with certain 
levels of political clout that could make sure the company’s bid was accepted over the bids of 
other businesses. Schabir Shaik became the most important figure in the trial, because it was 
alleged that he used his “personal relationship with Jacob Zuma to benefit himself and his 
companies.”13 It was found that the creators of the deal would have paid Zuma R500, 00014 to 
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facilitate the deal’s success with the ruling party and Zuma was also asked to protect the arms 
dealers from any investigation into their business transactions.15  
 Schabir Shaik was tried by South African courts and sentenced to fifteen years in jail for 
charges of corruption and fraud. The relationship between Shaik and Jacob Zuma was described 
as “inappropriate” by the court judge and Zuma was then indicted on corruption charges. 
Because of the nature of the charges, Zuma was then fired from his position of Deputy 
President by then- President Mbeki, and his trial was set for July 2006.16 This moment was 
significant because it illustrated to the public for the first time that there was conflict and 
questionable political practices within the ANC. It became acceptable for the media to cover 
these issues in the interest of the public.17 Zuma’s corruption case eventually collapsed; the 
judges ruled that there was not enough evidence against the politician to pursue the case 
further.18 Unfortunately, for Jacob Zuma, the case had left a stain on his integrity as a politician 
and his legal troubles had only begun.  
 Another event that Zuma was embroiled in during 2006 has probably become the most 
famous South African court case post-Apartheid. In 2006, Zuma was accused of raping an HIV-
positive family friend without protection. The timing was terrible—the stain of Zuma’s 
corruption trial was still fresh upon his reputation and Zuma was also heading the National AIDS 
Council at the time. Zuma became a media sensation almost overnight; he was ridiculed by 
almost every major news publication for his convoluted reactions to questioning in the 
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courtroom. A brief summary of the trial and Zuma’s testimonies can be found in the next 
paragraph. 
 Zuma pled not guilty to raping the 31 year old daughter of a family friend in his home on 
November 2nd, 2005. During the trial, Zuma’s lawyers requested that the accuser be questioned 
on her sexual past: the judge permitted this action. When asked why she did not tell Zuma to 
stop, the accuser said that she was paralyzed with fear and could not act properly, which is 
considered a typical reaction to sexual assault. Zuma’s lawyers continued to probe into the 
complainant’s sexual past, trying to find evidence of previous sexually illicit behavior. When 
Zuma was called upon to testify he began (in his native language of isiZulu) by describing his 
struggles against South African Apartheid and his traditional Zulu upbringing. Zuma then goes 
on to describe his version of the infamous evening’s events. He said that the intercourse was 
consensual and that he knew the accuser wanted to have sex with him because she wore only a 
kanga (wrap) and allowed Zuma to massage her. Zuma also stated that he knew that the 
accuser was HIV-positive but he did not have a condom at hand. Zuma then went on to say that 
after the encounter, he showered in order to minimize his chances of contracting the virus. 
Zuma then went on to state that since the accuser spent the night and accepted the cab fare 
that he offered her to return to her home she did not act as if she had been raped. As a final 
note, he explains that it is not acceptable in Zulu culture to leave a woman aroused without 
having sexual intercourse with her. Zuma states that it is part of his culture, and that he is a 
Zulu traditionalist.19  
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 Zuma’s rape trial seemed as if it would end his political career, especially because of the 
contrast that his Zulu ideals presented to the Western media sources that were rabidly 
following and commenting on the case. Instead, Zuma’s Zulu supporters turned out in the 
thousands to support him against what they called a “honey trap” created by his political 
opponents.20 Zuma’s trial was seen as a conspiracy to assassinate the leader’s character by his 
opponents. Zuma’s lawyers eventually found enough evidence against the accuser through her 
sexual history to get Zuma released from all charges. When Zuma was acquitted, he addressed 
the mostly Zulu crowd that waited outside the courthouse to congratulate him in his mother 
tongue of isiZulu. During the speech, Zuma excited the crowd with a rendition of the anti-
Apartheid song “Lethu Mshini Wami,” (Bring me my Machine Gun) which signified his strong 
ties to the struggle for freedom.21 It was obvious at this time that Zuma’s popularity was 
indomitable. Many believed that the rape trial and his testimonies’ portrayal in the media 
would end Zuma’s viability as a political candidate, but they were wrong. Zuma was elected 
ANC Secretary General in December 2007 by a significant majority. 
 Even with his overwhelming popularity with the majority of South Africans, Jacob 
Zuma’s presidency so far has not proven to hold the drastic change that many South Africans so 
desperately desired during Mbeki’s administration. The ANC’s inner leadership struggles, 
conflict in the tri-partite alliance and corruption have shadowed Zuma’s administration. It is 
difficult for South Africans to identify policies that Zuma has created during his term—many can 
only comment on the various scandals attached to his name. 
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Another problem seems to be arising for Zuma with the ANC Youth League, which was 
once one of his allies. Before Zuma was elected, leftist groups wanted to support him, to see 
him elected to make the changes that Mbeki did not feel were important or viable at the time. 
Now, Zuma is under attack because he has not yet made the policies that his constituency 
placed him in office to create. It seems that Zuma has not yet realized how much power this 
constituency holds, even though it influenced his election. He waves this constituency asides as 
if it were another bothersome lobby or critic. The President has instead turned to what he 
perceives as a bigger threat to his administration—the dramatic struggles within the ANC and 
the tri-partite alliance for political power, and what that could mean to his own grasp on the 
country.  
 President Zuma has recognized the factions within the ANC that dislike his 
administration and threaten to tear it down just as he did Mbeki’s. Zuma bemoans the current 
state of the ANC and the organization’s newfound ability to share its inner struggles with the 
media without his consent. He commented that a major challenge the ANC faces is the 
“disappearance of respect and discipline.”22 Zuma also calls on ANC members to stop “clique-
ism” and “gossip.”23 This attitude serves as evidence that Zuma is frustrated and frightened by 
the internal politics of the ANC; ironically, it is the formation and publicity of these internal 
politics that helped him become president in the first place.  
 Conflict within the tri-partite alliance also poses a threat to Zuma’s hegemony in the 
ANC. COSATU released “The Alliance at a Crossroads-the Battle against a Predatory Elite” in 
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September 2010.24 This primary document contains evidence of COSATU’s perceptions of the 
alliance’s erosion as a result of the ANC’s capitalist policies. The document, more importantly, 
discusses the emergence of a corrupt “predatory elite” which milks South Africa’s wealth for its 
own purposes and keeps the black African majority in poverty. This document seems to be a 
thinly veiled accusation aimed toward Jacob Zuma’s administration, which had previously fallen 
under scrutiny for corruption. Zuma’s administration reacted by creating the controversial 
“secrecy bill” which gives ANC members the right to classify any information as secret and to 
disallow the press from publishing anything the ANC does not want to become public.25 This bill 
is an effort not only to keep state secrets from being announced in a post-Wiki Leaks era, but to 
prevent any further conflict within the ANC from becoming public knowledge, and most 
importantly-- the business doings of any ANC members that would not be considered proper by 
the standards COSATU or any South African constituency will also not be released to the public .  
 Dale McKinley, known for his participation in and analysis of South African leftist 
politics, believes that although COSATU and the SACP may be able to hold key positions in the 
alliance, they will never hold substantial power in the making of policy.26 The creation of the 
secrecy bill by the ANC has made McKinley’s theory even more apparent. Although COSATU and 
the SACP face a lack of voice within the alliance, they still have the power at the grassroots level 
to severely discipline leaders of the ANC with votes during election time. Zuma knows this as 
well, since the combined powers of the SACP and COSATU helped him to be elected Secretary-
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General of the ANC.27. Zwelinzima Vavi, the highly vocal leader of COSATU, does not seem to 
want to step down and relinquish all power to the ANC, as they would have him do.28 This 
power struggle does not seem to have an end in the near future, and could act as an irritant to 
Jacob Zuma throughout his presidency unless he agrees with COSATU to make major changes in 
policy, or if he silences the group altogether, which could become extremely controversial.  
 With the watchdogs of the ANC’s politics muzzled by the secrecy bill and the lack of 
voice they have within the alliance, the situation in South Africa seems worrisome. Without any 
sort of governmental transparency, the chances of corruption at any level will rise precipitously. 
With the current president’s history in the field of corruption, this is a legitimate fear for South 
Africans.  
 Corruption has overshadowed Jacob Zuma beginning in 2001 with the Shaik scandal 
until the present day. Besides allegations from COSATU’s “predatory elite” document that calls 
for more investigation into the finances of South African leaders, Zuma has regularly appeared 
to be linked to questionable behavior where his finances are concerned. A simple Google 
search of “Jacob Zuma Corruption” yields many op-eds and newspaper articles tying Zuma and 
his followers to suspicious behavior.  
 For example, in 2010, Zuma’s nephew, Khulubuse Zuma, was tied to a scandal involving 
the company he chaired, Aurora Empowerment Systems. Aurora Systems bought Pamodzi Mine 
after the company declared bankruptcy in 2009.29 Immediately after the mines were bought, 
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wages stopped being paid to employees.30 After that, many illegal workers were reported to be 
on the premises, working in the mines.31 Finally, Aurora Systems turned off the electricity going 
to the communities where its workers lived.32 The company, Aurora Systems, was not punished 
by the government for the way it treated its workers, and instead the company and the 
government laid the blame at the feet of some of its foreign investors. Khulubuse Zuma was 
rumored to have made several million Rand from the liquidation deal. This incident serves as an 
example for South Africans who wish to talk about Zuma’s presidency and how it has treated 
the poor and working classes. The mine is now being sold off in sections to foreign companies, 
and the workers have no hopes of being treated fairly unless the ANC works with COSATU on its 
labor policies, which does not seem likely considering the relationship between the two groups. 
By allowing for the poor and working classes to be treated as cheap migrant labor, the ANC and 
Zuma’s administration are certainly not earning any respect from its former supporters.  
 For another perspective, one could use the example of the corruption hotline that Jacob 
Zuma himself established in South Africa in September 2009 to help his image appear tough on 
corruption. Zuma created the hotline in response to a vast amount of pressure he was receiving 
from rival political parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and from anti-corruption 
demonstrations incited by COSATU and the ANCYL.33 The President even worked the phones 
himself when the line was established. On the first day, the center received 27,000 calls from 
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frustrated South Africans complaining about corruption and service delivery in their local 
municipalities. In October of the same year, the line was reportedly so “swamped with calls” 
that when the DA called it 42 times, it was unable to access an operator. It seems as though 
corruption is so deeply rooted in Zuma’s administration that local authorities cannot keep up 
with the demand or have simply resigned themselves to living in such a frustrating situation.  
 The current South African political situation seems frustrating and disappointing for 
many South Africans who expected a return to the type of leadership that Nelson Mandela 
represented for the ANC. The fact that there are so many strong factions within the ANC—and 
the tripartite alliance as a whole—serves as a warning sign that bigger upsets have the 
opportunity to occur. The media attention paid to these signs shows the world that perhaps the 
ANC no longer wields the absolute unquestioned power that they had in the days directly after 
Apartheid. These factions draw the attention of political leaders from the big issues that 
threaten all South Africans and back into the political arena. Because of these political 
machinations and their effects, there has been a vacuum of public leadership in the Zuma 
administration. 
 This vacuum of leadership is incredibly dangerous for President Zuma, because it 
distracts his priorities away from those who advocated for him, the poor black African majority. 
This majority is sick of corruption, it is sick of false promises from its leaders. This attitude 
leaves a position for someone to step in and lead this significant constituency with promises 
that he will help them to get what they want—economic freedom and equality for all South 
Africans, regardless of race or socioeconomic status in the foreseeable future. This equality 
begins with providing basic services for all South Africans, and this has yet to be done.  A 
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mixture of frustration and disillusionment from a large segment of the populace could prove to 
be fatal for Jacob Zuma’s presidency or his image as a politician. The people of South Africa 
want to see positive change in their communities, in their homes. The current economic and 
political situation is not acceptable to them, and they have made their disillusionment and their 
impatience known in the past few years—first, with Zuma’s election, and now with protests and 
strikes. This brings forth the second chapter of this piece, and another issue that frustrates and 
angers the majority of South Africans—service delivery to the poorest black African 
neighborhoods—services are disappearing at a rapid rate, and the people want to know what 
they have done to deserve such apathy from their own government.  
  
  
    



















Chapter Two: “Service Non-Delivery” 
 
 During South African President Jacob Zuma’s tenure in office, there has been a rise in 
the number of demonstrations and protests relating to the issue of service delivery in 
underserved neighborhoods throughout the country. For the purpose of this chapter, service 
delivery is defined as the provision of basic municipal services such as electricity, running water, 
housing, toilets, and trash collection by the governing body. Recent protests over the lack of 
such services in poorer neighborhoods brings attention to the fact that the Zuma 
administration seems to have slowed down or abandoned the efforts to develop the country’s 
domestic economy on an equal footing. These issues, however, are not Zuma’s creation; the 
disparities between rich and poor have always been great in South Africa even before the 
racially separated system of Apartheid, which ruled the country for almost 50 years. There has 
been a swift decline in service delivery since the era of Mbeki and in turn the satisfaction of the 
poorest of South Africans (the ANC’s largest constituency) has dropped precipitously since the 
year 2000. This presents a considerable problem for President Zuma and his supporters in the 
ANC since the lowest classes (and largest constituency) have the ability to exert considerable 
stress on the political situation in South Africa. The service delivery problem is becoming much 
more of a political liability for the ANC as time moves forward.  
 The Apartheid era in South Africa (1946-1994) was characterized by vast political, 
economic and social inequalities across racial lines. During this time, each race was assigned  its 
own unequal housing situations—black Africans and ‘coloureds’ of mixed race were forcibly 
moved into houseless townships on the outskirts of major cities or Bantustans in the worst 
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parts of the countryside where they were forced to build and live in shacks.34 This occurred as a 
result of the Group Areas Act of 1950, a major pillar of Apartheid legislation that compelled 
people of the same race to live together and with no others of a different race.35 These racially 
segregated communities were established without advance notice or planning and as a result, 
basic services were poor or nonexistent in these areas. One of the reasons for this was the 
absence of strong local leadership within these forcefully formed communities; whatever 
government that did exist was more symbolic than functional and the actual running of the 
segregated communities was done by the racist National Party that established Apartheid.36 
With this lack of leadership, no one brought communities together to protest living conditions, 
and the Apartheid leaders kept down any hint of insurrection against the established system. 
 During Apartheid, service delivery in black and coloured communities was substandard 
in comparison to that of white communities because of the extremely racist nature of the 
governing system in place. The community aspect of the Apartheid system was modeled after 
the American “Jim Crow” laws which demanded residential segregation. White people lived in 
the same ways that the majority of Western families lived, with modern conveniences and with 
regular services provided by their local government, such as trash pickup and sewer systems. 
Non-white communities were not bestowed with the tremendous privilege that their white 
counterparts were given in their segregated urban areas; the National Party delivered few 
services to the Bantustans and townships.  Essentially, the only service delivered to non-whites 
under the National Party’s leadership was the building of ‘matchbox houses’ for a privileged 
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few. These houses built by the Apartheid regime cost $2500 and were small living spaces 
comprised of approximately 430 square feet.37 Often, these structures were not used as single-
family homes; many South Africans made their homes in such a building—at night the floor and 
furniture were covered with sleeping bodies. The majority of these communities did not have 
running water or toilets in their homes, nor were the houses equipped with electricity.38  Since 
the Apartheid government only built homes for a select few in areas close to cities, the rest of 
the non-white population was resigned to living in informal settlements in hastily erected 
shacks on the infertile land they were allocated. These informal homes rarely kept people 
properly warm, let alone provided for electricity or proper plumbing. During the South African 
Apartheid, only whites were allowed to experience the conveniences of living in the 20th 
century: all others were forced to live on top of one another in a desolate landscape without 
hope of advancing past a predetermined existence because of the color of their skin.  
 
 
To the right is a photograph taken by the 
author of an Apartheid-era “Matchbox House” which 
was meant to house a family of four, but only 
contained 430 square feet. 
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 After the fall of Apartheid’s regime and the first democratic elections in 1994, it was 
expected that there would be changes in the realm of service delivery for non-white 
communities. The emergence of a “Rainbow Nation” wherein equal treatment of all races, 
sexes and classes was legally enforced would also bring access to modern conveniences to all of 
its citizens. The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which is discussed in detail 
later in the chapter, reflected this fixation on domestic economic development and the ability 
of non-whites to partake in the nation’s wealth. The plan promised to set aside significant 
amounts of money for the development of South Africa’s infrastructure and welfare systems, 
and its implementation was highly anticipated by the ANC’s voters. But, one must remember 
that the South African governing body had a herculean duty to perform for its people. The 
country’s infrastructure had only been developed to serve a small minority of white citizens 
properly; it was almost as if the country’s population had tripled overnight when the ANC came 
into power. The liberating party would be compelled to build much more framework and work 
out an efficient system to deliver public goods. The oppression of Apartheid had left many 
challenges to be dealt with after its passing, and the ANC had to fulfill the country’s giant 
expectations. 
The RDP and Service Delivery 
  The RDP was designed as a set of economic goals for post-apartheid South Africa 
to steer itself toward in the years after liberation. It was designed primarily by COSATU and was 
thought to keep the ANC in touch with its leftist beginnings and with the majority of the 
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country’s poor populace.39 The plan was essentially an unbudgeted wish list created as a 
contrast to the depravity forced on most South Africans in the name of Apartheid. Among other 
things, the RDP proposed for the government to build one million homes in the five years after 
liberation, and also to redistribute 30 percent of the land during that time. 40 It projected in RDP 
that during the ten years after liberation there would be free compulsory education for all and 
that over three million jobs would be created during that first decade.41 The plan also proposed 
that in ten years’ time, every home in the country would be equipped with basic services--
running water and electricity.42 The RDP was an ambitious plan created by those who had been 
subjugated by the inequities of Apartheid; it promised service delivery to all South Africans who 
had not previously had access to such modern comforts. It promised homes to people who 
were living in dusty shacks, and it promised jobs to those who did not have the opportunity to 
work to feed their families. Many branded the RDP a socialist utopian dream that was likely to 
fail, but against these critiques, it is still apparent that the plan had the good of all South 
Africans in mind, and if properly implemented, it could have vastly improved he situation of the 
poor. 
In the two years after 1994 that the RDP was fully implemented, it was highly advocated 
by the working class as a result of its creation by the labor union COSATU. In full swing, the RDP 
was predicted to cost the new South African government 90 billion rand, which is equivalent to 
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about 13 billion US dollars in today’s economy.43 During his administration, Nelson Mandela cut 
this figure by a third, citing that it was too expensive for the country’s fledgling economy to 
fully support.44 As a result of this monetary loss, it can be inferred that the plan would only 
yield two-thirds of its promised outcomes, and would begin to look unsuccessful to its enemies.  
 After only two years of the RDP as the primary economic framework for South Africa’s 
economic development, the leaders of the ANC were unsatisfied with the economy’s 
dangerously slow pace of domestic growth the stagnancy of the country’s international 
economic position and decided to scrap the plan in favor of Mbeki’s brainchild-- Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). One of the reasons behind this decision to change was 
the precipitous fall in value of the Rand on world markets, and the fear of South Africa’s 
financial collapse if there was no major economic change.45 This plan allowed for more market-
based approaches and a macro-economic outlook to satisfy and gain foreign direct investment; 
the plan obeyed the teachings of the Washington Consensus and eventually took service 
delivery from the government’s hands and repurposed it into work for private contractors.   
 While RDP did not have a long lifespan on the stage of South African politics, it did 
elevate South Africans’ expectations for the role of the ANC in the realm of service delivery. 
Because of RDP, the ruling party was expected to provide solutions for the lack of housing and 
jobs left behind by the Apartheid system. These expectations will become very important later 
in this chapter, because they are a big part of the current vocalized dissatisfaction with service 
delivery. GEAR took the place of RDP because it was estimated to be more fiscally responsible 
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and would quickly lead the nation to higher growth, but would it work for everyone? Would it 
lead all South Africans to economic equality and squash the inequalities between classes? 
Eventually, it would turn out that GEAR and its market-favoring policies would have a different 
effect than its creators originally planned. 
 
GEAR and Service Delivery 
 Mbeki’s ideal economic framework, GEAR, was launched in 1996, and because of the 
precipitously falling currency values and problems in the global economic climate, it was 
supported by the majority of the leadership of the ANC; the rest of the alliance was not 
consulted about the country’s economic policy and there were no negotiations in the tri-partite 
alliance once GEAR was proposed.46 Some have called the installation of GEAR the end of black 
and white South Africa—a country divided on racial lines—and instead the beginning of rich 
and poor South Africa; it heralded the creation of a country with massive class differences.47 
GEAR was meant to enrich the lives of the poorest South African citizens--people who were 
living in informal settlements with no running water and no hope of a job--by creating wealth 
and capital for the country that would eventually be redistributed evenly throughout the 
populace via the job creation that would stem from enormous growth.48 GEAR began as a 
project with good intentions, but it involved too many with interests from the private sector, 
too much foreign money, and too many people that had never known poverty or struggle.    
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 GEAR is an economic framework that embraced the Western ideal of capitalism and the 
perceived benefits of a free-market economy.49 The goals of GEAR were to allow for more 
foreign and domestic investment by lowering government regulation.50 It was also made to cut 
government spending drastically, and to let the issues of poverty sort themselves out in the 
newly empowered private market. Trevor Manuel, the chief finance minister at the time 
explained that instead of a traditional ‘trickle down’ method, GEAR would instead enable very 
fast paced economic growth and it would pull the poorer classes upward with its momentum.51 
At the time, many developing countries and even large Western powers were embracing this 
neo-liberal economic framework. After the announcement that South Africa would switch to 
GEAR, the plummet of the Rand’s value stopped, and the country’s currency began to reclaim 
its value in small amounts. But, it was not easy for the ANC to install the plan. COSATU and the 
SACP (the ANC’s allies), angered since they had not been consulted on GEAR, worked to block 
privatization of national industries and used the labor force as a weapon against the ANC via 
nationwide strikes.52 This caused Mbeki to back off from pushing GEAR wholeheartedly 
forward; in reality the plan was only used halfway and only some national industries were 
privatized. This left a gap between the jurisdiction of the national government in industries such 
as water supply, electric companies and municipal trash pickup. As a result of this confusion, 
South African public service delivery suffered. 
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More Obstacles and a Quick-Fix 
 The confusion caused by the blockage of GEAR was not the only contributor to poor 
service delivery in the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this time, there was also a great 
foreign policy issue that the Mbeki administration faced: Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, the doomed 
Mugabe regime struggled to stay in power at the cost of the Zimbabwean people, and masses 
of farmers and farmworkers were fleeing the country as quasi-refugees in fear of ZANU-PF’s 
power.53 Many members of this group of migrants chose to flee into South Africa across the 
border—an estimated 1 million Zimbabweans have illegally immigrated to South Africa in the 
21st century.54 These immigrants were mostly uneducated and unskilled workers that began 
competing for jobs and housing alongside their South African counterparts during a global 
economic recession. Predictably, this pushed the already strained South African economy 
almost to a breaking point. More and more people were living in informal housing, and making 
use of the limited resources that the South African government provided for the very poor. This 
angered many poor South Africans who felt that they should receive these resources before any 
foreigners. South Africans were already having a difficult time finding jobs and feeding their 
families; they did not welcome Zimbabweans competing with them for opportunities or 
resources. Recent South African attacks and killings of Zimbabwean immigrants confirm the 
attitude of the masses toward these unwelcome inhabitants. Immigrants have been deported 
back to Zimbabwe in the thousands from South Africa, illustrating that the country simply does 
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not have the infrastructure or economic ability to support any more people in poverty: South 
Africa has reached its limit.55  
 In order to promote the economy and improve employment opportunities for the 
poorest of Black South Africans so that they could properly support themselves, President 
Mbeki proposed his now infamous Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) framework a few years 
after GEAR. BEE was a program launched to address the inequalities proliferated by Apartheid 
by giving disadvantaged non-white (mostly black African) groups economic opportunities such 
as skill development, preference in business, and capital.56 This movement was created to 
achieve two things: to encourage a black bourgeoisie and to raise black small business owners 
from poverty into the middle class. The majority of the first participants in BEE came directly 
from the leadership of the ANC.57  The system eventually became a shadow of its intended 
purpose because it helped South Africans who were not extremely poor before it helped those 
who had been extremely affected by Apartheid and the global economic recession. BEE worked 
instead as a quick-fix for Mbeki’s administration in regards to unemployment and failing 
corporations. When powerful black-owned businesses failed due to bad investments or poorly 
made decisions, BEE was there to bail them out.58 Huge South African corporations began to 
add black employees to their operating boards or appoint black CEOS because of the 
preferential treatment the government gave to companies who met such qualifications.59 In 
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some situations, the black employees legitimately deserved these positions and had been 
previously looked over because of the remaining pressures of Apartheid, but in other situations, 
these black business leaders were mere puppets; they were told to sit in a position and perform 
as actors because of the benefits the company would receive. For many members of the black 
middle class, BEE meant more money and a chance to climb the social ladder after years of 
waiting, but for the poorest black South Africans, BEE was a failed dream. 
BEE did not take care of small South African businesses as many had hoped—if it had, 
perhaps employment would have increased and poverty would not have been so widespread 
during Mbeki’s administration. Money that was meant to be spent on education for business 
owners was instead appropriated to financing and credit schemes, because that was what BEE 
administrators thought that small business owners needed.60 Small businesses should have 
been given education and lessons in spending money properly for expansion before they were 
given loans. This illustrates how out of touch the leadership of the ANC was in regards to small 
business; they had much more experience dealing with large corporations. Small businesses 
given government contracts because of BEE were sometimes not paid for years, and small 
businesses could not afford to wait like big businesses could. For example, the local contractor 
used to renovate the inside of President Mbeki’s house in Pretoria had to let employees go and 
eventually filed bankruptcy because the government was too slow in paying him for his work.61 
These slow payment policies favored large corporations and not small businesses; even if the 
South African government were to give small black owned businesses major contracts, with this 
arrangement the contract was more a curse than a blessing. Black business owners who 
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complained were widely ignored, the ANC claimed that it had done all it could for these people. 
Sadly, there was a higher rate of successful small business building amongst whites and 
coloreds during the BEE’s heyday than business growth for black Africans. 
It seems from this section that GEAR started out with good intentions, and as it failed, 
more and more poor decisions were made in order to fix failures quickly. Instead of 
redistributing wealth, GEAR helped to concentrate riches in the upper classes of South African 
society. These policies have most likely resulted in South Africa having such massive gaps 
between socioeconomic classes and a reputation for income disparity. Modern South Africa 
now has these issues to struggle with as a result of the decision to be more capitalist and to 
please the international community, and as these issues escalate, South Africans are becoming 
angrier and the ANC is struggling to preserve its image.  
 
Service Delivery in the Present 
In the years since Jacobs Zuma’s election to the Presidency, there has been more 
attention brought to the issue of service delivery in poorer areas. This attention has been 
captured by township-wide protests because of service shut-offs, total loss of services or never 
having had access to such public goods. These protests are meant to put pressure on Zuma to 
keep his campaign promise to fight poverty. 
 In 2009, the Municipal IQ (a non-partisan program that monitors municipal services) 
reported that the number of protests relating to service delivery had nearly doubled in 
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comparison to years prior.62 The majority of these protests are peaceful reminders to help the 
poor, but a significant amount have turned into riots. For example, a protest demanding access 
to sewer systems in a township near Johannesburg resulted in two police cars being turned 
over and burned; the police officers eventually fired upon the crowd with rubber bullets to end 
the demonstrations.63  
 The reason that service delivery is so variable in the present is because of the uneven 
situation that local governance is in regarding water and electricity delivery. The ANC has called 
for audits into municipal services in order to pressure city councils to improve, but it seems that 
these audits have been ineffective so far.64 The problems that municipal governments face is 
that services are no longer nationalized operations; the majority are privatized as a result of 
GEAR’s neo-liberal ambitions. Presently, municipal governments are required to pay electric 
and water firms lump sums and to raise those sums by collecting utility fees from the 
community that uses the services.65 This is how utilities are delivered in some parts of the West, 
but in these instances, the community can afford to pay its bills. In South Africa, the official 
unemployment rate is close to thirty percent, which means that often there is no extra money 
in each individual family to pay electricity and water bills. The municipal government is then left 
with the fee from the water or electricity company with little or no resources to pay it. This 
leaves municipal governments in a financially difficult position where they have to cut off 
community services completely, and this situation angers community residents. 
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 Recently, a new system designed to take some of the pressure off municipal 
governments has been released. This new idea is a system of pre-paid plans, meaning that 
consumers can pay for their electric or water usages in advance. This method was created by 
the private sector, and the credits for electricity or water are easily accessible; they can be 
bought in grocery stores or pharmacies. By buying credits, consumers cut themselves off when 
they cannot afford the services, not the municipality.66 Areas with high instances of non-
payment have been targeted for these pre-paid utilities because of the constant cutoffs they 
faced under municipal supervision. Unfortunately, the pre-payment method works much better 
on paper than it does in practice. The fees for the pre-paid meters are higher, and companies 
legitimize this by claiming that the pre-paid meters are in high-risk neighborhoods that have 
been known to default.67But, it is interesting that they would choose to cite this as a reason 
since the services are pre-paid and therefore the company has nothing to lose if the customer 
cannot afford to pay—the meters simply shut down. Now, communities that had previously 
embraced the pre-paid system feel misled; they are paying more now for water and electricity 
than if they were on the prior system.68 They are being punished for being poor; they are 
paying higher prices than those who are better off. This is a legitimate reason for their anger, 
and it is understandable that these communities protest this treatment. 
 There are other aspects of the privatized service delivery system that annoys the poor—
the system treats people differently based on their neighborhood. Since the industry is 
privatized, there is no leeway with South Africans unable to pay their bills—in some 
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neighborhoods consumers are cut off if they are even a week late in payment. But, in other, 
more affluent neighborhoods, people who have not paid in months still receive electricity and 
water.69 Poor communities often have to face higher electricity and water prices than their 
affluent counterparts, and if they were to receive the affluent neighborhoods’ prices, they 
might be more likely to pay. To many, this seems like discrimination for being poor and a 
beneficial system for those who are wealthy. So instead of racial Apartheid, poor South Africans 
are compelled to deal with a cyclical classist system that is nearly impossible to break.  
 
Moving Forward? 
 Sociologist James Davies suggested in his article “Toward a Theory of Revolution” that 
individual expectations and reality usually coincide, but when they do not coincide, when 
reality does not live up to an individual’s expectations (usually because of a major event such as 
war or an economic downturn) the likelihood of revolution rises. Past a certain point, when 
reality is out of the acceptable gap between reality and expectation, there is almost guaranteed 
revolt. This action arises because the gap between expectations and reality help to solve a 
collective action problem, meaning that prior to this convergence, people cannot be expected 
to come together to take action. With the collective action problem solved, there is opportunity 
to come together and fight for the groups’ expected outcomes.70 This theory is commonly 
called the Davies J-Curve, and it is used in this chapter to explain the precipitous rise in protests 
and riots in South Africa. 
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 The rise of the ANC gave South Africans many great expectations. The promises made by 
the liberating party, such as economic equality and “a better life for all” helped the nation build 
up its hopes.71 These hopes were reflected in the RDP and its ambitious plans for South Africa’s 
future development. The platform of the ANC has been to improve the lives of those most 
devastated by Apartheid, and those most affected by Apartheid have always been the party’s 
biggest voting bloc. These people who have kept the party in power—with a two-thirds 
majority—expect that party to pay them back. These expectations come in the form of jobs, 
infrastructure and public services.  
 In reality, GEAR has reduced government spending by massive amounts, and there is 
little to no money allocated to domestic development. Trevor Manuel, former South African 
finance minister, explained the austerity measures put into place by GEAR and its effect on 
expectations most eloquently when he said,  
“We need to disabuse people of the notion that we will have a mighty powerful 
developmental state capable of planning and creating all manner of employment. It may 
have been on the horizon in 1994, but it could not be delivered now. The next period is 
likely to see a lot more competitiveness in the global economy. As consumer demand 
falls off there will be a huge battle between firms and countries to secure access to 
markets.72” 
 
Manuel, a neo-liberalist, has the legacy of GEAR to protect, and calls for a South African 
austerity measures in the face of a global economic crisis. Manuel represents reality in this 
situation, while the hopes that the country held in 1994 of a powerful developmental state with 
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full control over development has become the expectations of the people. These realities and 
expectations are moving apart at a rapid pace as markets become more and more competitive, 
and as the South African government tightens its belt against losses. 
 Understanding the gaps between reality and expectations is the first step in 
understanding the protests and problems behind service delivery in South Africa. In the current 
economic climate, it does not seem that the ANC will be changing its economic framework 
anytime soon. And, if GEAR remains the prevalent mechanism for controlling state funds in 
South Africa, development for the poorest citizens will be slow or stopped for the next decade 
or so. This does not mean that the angry protests will stop. On the contrary, it does not seem 
that South Africans’ expectations have changed with the realities of the present. South Africans 
will continue to demonstrate their frustration with the ruling party, and this situation could get 
more serious as time goes on and people begin to get more organized.  
 South Africans are already seeing this happen in the youngest generations. The country 
has a legacy pertaining to youth activism—many members of the ANC started their careers in 
the political party in their early teens—and that legacy continues today. Perhaps the youth will 
hold the keys in furthering the issue of service non-delivery in South Africa, and the youth, with 
their energy and idealism, could potentially be the group that brings the change that South 







Chapter Three: “South African Strife” 
 
 In the past few years, there has been a precipitous rise in protests and revolts 
concerning living conditions and income disparities in South Africa. The majority of these 
movements have been led by members of the Left in South Africa, such as the labor unions and 
African National Congress’ Youth League (ANCYL). Although these organizations are tied to the 
ANC via a system of alliances, their leaders choose to criticize the ruling party publicly using 
their grassroots base as political leverage. These protests, besides illustrating the breakdown of 
the ANC’s alliances, also serve to highlight the fact that South Africans are becoming angry 
enough to come together in objection to policy measures or a lack of thereof which they feel 
harm their ability to thrive economically.  
 These protests are the results of South Africans’ disappointment regarding the 
governing of the country. As was stated in the second chapter, these expectations are 
appropriately represented by the political revolution theory demonstrated by the Davies J-
Curve, and the current global economic recession has impacted the realities surrounding those 
expectations.73 When the gap between expectation and reality becomes too large, it is easier to 
overcome personal psychological barriers against organizing together and publically 
demonstrating widespread discontent. Since the peoples’ expectations have not been met by 
their leaders, nor does it seem likely that they will in the near future, the gap separating 
expectations and realities will widen and South Africans will feel comfortable coming together 
more often to reveal their displeasure with current domestic economic policies. Additionally, 
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the majority of these protestors is under age 40, and is a member of the poor or working 
classes. This comes as no surprise as South Africa has a young population (approximately 40 
percent are below 35 years of age), and joblessness tends to affect that group the most.74 This 
population is also the most likely to organize around shared discontent. 
 There is a long and significant history of youth movements and youth involvement in 
South African politics. In the most important historical moments during the fight against 
Apartheid, young people felt compelled to demonstrate their anger. These events, such as the 
Soweto Uprisings and violent resistance in black townships, were orchestrated by the 
passionate drive of young South Africans who desired a life free from racist control. Nelson 
Mandela himself was a member of the ANC’s Youth League, the branch of the ANC dedicated to 
bringing the passionate ideals of the youth under the wing of more experienced and pragmatic 
political leadership. The founding members of the group wrote the ANCYL constitution with its 
aims and objectives to “support and reinforce the African National Congress in the attainment 
of the goals of the National Democratic Revolution.”75 In essence, the ANCYL was created to 
compel the ANC forward toward liberation and equality with the ideology and energy of its 
youngest members as its engine. During Mandela’s tenure in the organization, he used the 
ANCYL as a platform to critique the ANC’s polices and to push for radical change. Mandela and 
his friends gained a wide base that championed their more radical beliefs; in this way the 
ANCYL gained considerable sway over the conscience of the ANC. The pressure exerted by 
Mandela and his followers was so intense that in 1949, the ANC adopted the “Programme of 
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Action,” authored and promoted by the highest ranking members of the ANCYL. This 
implementation was a turning point for the political party; it transformed the ANC from a 
passive, black bourgeois intellectual group into a fully formed liberation movement.76 Because 
of the actions of the ANCYL’s leadership during the 1940s and 1950s, the ANC went from being 
a tired and powerless political group to a leader of resistance in the struggle against Apartheid.  
 Mandela’s “Programme of Action” was considered to be extreme for the times, but it 
helped shape the modern ANC as well as the ANCYL. The plan called for the rejection of 
segregation and of white leadership altogether and reflected the African Nationalist 
Movement’s primary beliefs such as black Africans standing on their own in the name of 
liberation, and of creating a pan-African nation-state.77 The plan highlights the militant radical 
ideas that Mandela’s generation held at the time and it used those views to reinvigorate the 
ANC. Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo made it obvious that the ANC’s 
character needed to be changed in 1949 in order to effectively fight Apartheid. These men’s 
plan put the ANC on the path to liberating South Africa and ending Apartheid in their lifetimes. 
Their work toward political equality and strengthening the base of the ANC remains evident 
even today, as demonstrated by the ANC’s two thirds majority in South Africa. Their energy still 
remains in the ANCYL, and like their predecessors the current generation believes that the ANC 
needs to change. The modern ANCYL has some radical ideas on how to create that change.  
 Now, the ANC has 20 years of national leadership behind it and about half of black 
South African households remain dangerously below the poverty line, while only 2% of white 
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households are in that same grouping.78 Although this is a positive change in comparison to the 
days of Apartheid when nearly all black South Africans lived in poverty, it is not significant 
enough to keep the populace from becoming agitated. The amount of change in the past 20 
years is insignificant enough to rile the more leftist members of the ANCYL. Realistically, the 
expectations that black South Africans hold do not meet with the realities that the ANC has to 
offer, but the ANCYL does not take this into account. All South Africans have seen evidence of 
the amazing economic growth that the country has achieved in the past 20 years, and they 
want to be a part of it. In the past two or three years since the global economic downturn, the 
underlying tensions between the poor and the ANC have become much more noticeable. This 
Sandton vs. Soweto, or rich vs. poor mindset reflects tensions felt around the world and is 
encouraged by global protests ranging from the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement. Will poor South Africans get so frustrated with the ANC’s service delivery and 
political performance that they will no longer revere the ANC as the liberating party? Have 
black South Africans become disillusioned with the party that was supposed to represent their 
interests but instead catered to corporations and the Washington Consensus? Will the ANCYL 
use these tensions to exert pressure on the ANC like Mandela did half a century ago? 
 
Evidence of Unrest 
 The rumblings of unrest began in 2006 with a COSATU-led protest against the massive 
job losses that South Africans faced when textile factories began to move to countries with 
lower labor standards (mostly in East Asia)  as well as the closing of the vital Johannesburg 
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mines. The loss of over 100,000 jobs affected mostly unskilled, uneducated workers; those jobs 
are often the hardest to bring back after they are gone as a result of globalization and South 
Africa’s relatively high labor standards.79 The COSATU-led strike lasted more than two months 
and the police were called in several times when the demonstrations became violent. This 
strike helped to draw the ANC’s attention to workers’ issues. Although this strike ended with a 
compromise between COSATU and the ANC, it would precede many more violent 
demonstrations as the economy grew worse. 
 During the power struggle between then-president Thabo Mbeki and his political 
challenger Jacob Zuma, it was evident that the majority of the country desired a tangible 
change in their living standards. Change became the center of the shifting political climate. 
Demonstrations supporting Zuma’s poor-favoring platform were rampant in the days leading to 
the election. South Africans gathered in their townships to protest high crime and slow rates of 
development for the poorest segments within the economy. In response, the populist Zuma 
promised to address these issues if he won the election.  
 When Zuma beat Mbeki at the polls, the country held its breath in anticipation to see if 
the new President would keep his promise and transform the framework of South Africa’s 
domestic economy. Unfortunately, Zuma’s hands were tied by the promise to the ANC that 
Zuma’s administration would not change the already established economic policies.80 Neo-
liberalism would remain the South African economy’s prevailing economic operating system. 
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When it became obvious that Zuma would not be favoring the left in his policies, the strikes and 
protests began again in earnest, beginning with the working class and their political allies.  
COSATU made it especially difficult for Zuma to keep control of the South African 
economy. On June 5, 2009, COSATU leader Zwelinzima Vavi warned Zuma and his cabinet that 
“Workers are sick and tired, they simply have had enough.” 81 A month later, over 70,000 FIFA 
World Cup construction workers began a strike over working conditions and pay, demanding a 
13% wage increase before they would go back to building the vital soccer stadiums and other 
national infrastructure needed for the tournament.82 These workers were publicly supported by 
COSATU, and since the strike interfered with World Cup arrangements, the protest and its 
causes became global news. This strike was significant because it brought the battles between 
the South African working class and the South African ruling class to light, and since then the 
protests have gained momentum.  
 In early 2011, a record number of workers from a myriad of industries declared a strike 
at the same time. Once again, they were organized by COSATU. This time around, the workers 
demanded that their pay be increased by 10%; in the negotiating process, worker 
representatives pointed out that executives in their industries made almost 400 times what the 
average laborer took home per month—contributing to the enormous income gap that South 
Africa has become infamous for.83 This strike was not simply a complaint about working 
conditions—it represented a class issue. In the end, workers only received a 6.8 percent wage 
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increase, which came tied to a warning from the South African government.84 This time, Zuma’s 
administration struck back against both the unruly workers and COSATU, by publically chiding 
COSATU for leading worker insurrections when the country faced a 25 percent unemployment 
rate and a global economic recession.85 Zuma’s administration felt that the standards that 
South African workers desired were much too high to compete in a globalized market. The 
official comments from Zuma’s ministers reprimanding COSATU made the labor union lose face 
on a global scale and caused workers to become even angrier at the ruling party.86 The 
comments illustrated exactly where Zuma and his cabinet  stood on the job and labor issue, and 
that position was sure to only be of benefit to South Africa’s richest: the leaders and owners of 
national firms and international corporations.   
 After the 2011 strike, the relationship between COSATU and the ANC became tense. 
Zuma was no longer content with allowing COSATU to flex its muscles against the private sector 
and he began to strongly criticize any mention of strikes or worker dissatisfaction. Local 
governments followed the ANC’s direction and began to arrest protestors. COSATU continued 
its public criticism of the ANC, calling for the membership of the labor group to “fumigate” the 
ANC during the upcoming 2012 election.87 Secretary General of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, 
called for the removal of unspecified ANC leaders, saying that "They are the ones who could not 
care less about the problems of the masses. They are only interested in government positions 
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and tenders.”88 Vavi then went on to say that COSATU would not target Zuma specifically, but 
that the group hoped that the President would listen to their complaints. COSATU also planned 
a demonstration on a national scale in February 2012 in order to remind business leaders and 
policy makers that labor in South Africa does indeed have the power to exert political and 
economic pressure on the ruling classes.89 
 The show of force by COSATU appears to be a warning to Zuma’s administration, 
perhaps even a threat. COSATU is obviously very disappointed with the way that their chosen 
candidate betrayed them, and perhaps they feel that by ridding Zuma of anti-labor influences, 
they could potentially regain the power they lost when South Africa adopted neo-liberal 
economic policies. On the other hand, COSATU could still present a threat to Jacob Zuma as 
President if they chose to use their grassroots strength against him. Their demonstrations could 
simply be a reminder to President Zuma that he needs to remember those who helped him win 
his place or else his position in the ANC can become forfeit. Either way, COSATU seems to be 
very aggressively informing the ANC that the labor group is not pleased with current policies 
and expects to see positive change in the direction of labor. This is not just evidence of unrest 
throughout South Africa’s working class, but it specifically highlights unrest at the very top of 
the political framework. By publically commenting on issues facing South Africa, COSATU is 
reminding the ANC of the political pulse it feels within its grassroots membership. The question 
is—will the ANC and its leadership heed this warning? 
 
 








 In recent years, the ANCYL has functioned as a limb of the ANC, generally agreeing with 
the party’s choices of policy and appointments. It is even written into the ANCYL’s constitution 
that “the Youth League will function as an autonomous body within the overall structure of the 
ANC, of which it will be integral part, with its own constitution, rules and regulations. It shall be 
based on the political and ideological objectives of the ANC.”90 Unfortunately, this part of the 
ANCYL’s constitution has left much room for interpretation recently.  
It has become a very recent phenomenon that the ANC and the ANCYL’s political and 
ideological objectives have diverged. Predictably, that cleft can be traced back to the great 
schism of the ANC’s power, the election of Jacob Zuma. When Zuma ran against Mbeki, he had 
the full support of the ANCYL through the loyalties of one of its more visible members, Julius 
Malema. Coming out in support for Zuma also brought the ANCYL into the spotlight, as Malema 
publically stated that he would “kill for Zuma,” and that he did not think that Zuma’s rape 
charges were legitimate.91 Malema also verbally attacked Helen Zille, the leader of the 
Democratic Alliance, the ANC’s rival on the Western Cape. Malema commented that Zille was 
“fake” and told the press that she had had many cosmetic procedures in order to take the 
attention away from her political capabilities.92 These shocking public statements brought Julius 
Malema into the public eye, not only as a Zuma supporter, but as a radical who could be 
counted on to incite controversy. By the end of the election Malema was as widely known as 
the new South African President. 
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In return for his outstanding and sometimes outspoken loyalty to Zuma’s cause, Malema 
was elected President of the ANCYL in 2008 in an extremely close race.93 With a new President 
so allied with Zuma, it seemed that the ANCYL would simply follow the ANC and its policies 
without question. Zuma was building a wall of supporters around himself; he did not expect for 
the majority of his political problems to stem from that choice. 
In the first years of Zuma’s presidency, all appeared to be well between the ANC and its 
Youth League. Yet, the troubles started when Malema’s actions and comments began bringing 
negative attention to the party. First, Malema was charged for hate speech for singing old anti-
Apartheid song such as “Shoot the Boer” and “Bring me my Machine Gun.”94 His actions were 
fraught with meaning for a country still coming out of the racial tensions left there by 
Apartheid. Many were quick to note that his legal troubles followed in the footsteps of his 
proclaimed role model, Jacob Zuma. During his trial, Malema stated that his songs were meant 
as an ideological return to the passion of fighting Apartheid, not an actual allusion to violence.95 
Regardless, Malema was found guilty of hate speech, but the ANC did nothing to punish the 
leader of its Youth League. Instead, the ANC questioned the verdict and Malema kept his 
supporters, growing in power and confidence with South Africa’s most powerful political party 
behind him.  
But in the past year, the ANC has become less fond of its junior branch, especially its 
President. With growing financial pressure stemming from the global economic downturn, and 
with the strikes and complaints from COSATU, Zuma’s administration was not expecting any 
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new enemies. Malema, used to being supported by the ANC, felt freer to say what he felt about 
many political issues, even if those comments reflected negatively on the ANC. Entire books 
have been created to record the often politically incorrect statements that drop from Malema’s 
mouth, such as The World According to Julius Malema and Come Again? Quotes from the 
Famous, the Infamous and the Ordinary. Over the next few months, Malema stepped closer and 
closer to seeing what the invisible line of the ANC’s anger actually was for him.  
The biggest issue that faces the modern ANC is the promises left unfulfilled by South 
Africa’s constitution. Malema has made fulfilling these promises his main goal, and it is those 
unresolved issues that have driven a wedge between the ANC and the ANCYL. The academic 
writer Achille Mbembe writes very clearly about the divergence between the idealistic notions 
that the ANC of 1994 embraced and the realism that permeates the party today in his foreword 
for Fiona Forde’s book on Malema. Mbembe reiterates that South African youth have an 
especially difficult time becoming a functioning part of the South African economy, and that 
they are angry with the privatization of wealth when the South African Constitution promises a 
redistribution of the country’s riches.96 Malema, as the representative for the youth of South 
Africa, works to bring this anger to light. As time goes on, this anger of the youth has become 
more and more obvious, and instead of merely brushing Malema aside as an extremist, many 
are beginning to pay attention to the young politician. Malema continues to gain support from 
Zuma’s main constituency, and many anticipate (or fear) that in the 2012 ANC election, Julius 
Malema will have a much larger and more visible role than he has in the past. 
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Presenting the People’s Demands 
Now that Malema’s political fortune is on the rise, he feels comfortable presenting the 
ANC and the world with a list of his ideas and demands for the governance of the South African 
economy. These ideas are considered leftist and extreme, harkening back to the main purpose 
of the Mandela-era ANCYL. The hopes that Malema and his allies have for the future of South 
Africa are as follows. 
1. “Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime”: This is both the main political platform and 
campaign slogan for Malema’s position as ANCYL President—the catchphrase is 
on every part of the ANCYL’s website, next to a picture of Malema’s face. The 
phrase is interpreted as the declaration that those who were punished harshly 
by the Apartheid system (essentially all non-whites) ought to make use of the 
charters for nationalization of South African natural resources and land 
redistribution inserted into the country’s own Constitution. This slogan, 
“Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime” is essentially a cry for the nationalization of 
all South African mines, and a land redistribution policy.97 
2. “Social Transformation”: South Africa is not yet a post-racial society and it does 
not seem that the country will have perfect race relations in the next decade. 
The ANCYL calls for social reparations to be paid to those who were the most 
punished by Apartheid. These reparations include stronger drug and alcohol 
restrictions to prevent abuse, correcting human settlement patterns, developing 
rural South Africa, and more steps toward gender equality.98 
3. “Youth Development”: Predictably, the ANCYL pushes very hard for the inclusion 
of younger South Africans to be involved in the economy. South Africa is a young 
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country: 65.8 percent is of working age (between 15 and 64).99 In this age group, 
the official unemployment rate is 48.2 percent.100 The ANCYL proposes a 
framework that will enable the younger part (under 35) of this prevalent age 
group to have access to education and skills training, economic training, social 
skill training, and lobbying advocacy. This plan, known as the National Youth 
Policy, would target what they consider “youth at risk” which includes women, 
the disabled (including HIV/AIDS patients), the rural poor, and the unemployed. 
This serves as a challenge to the current policies on youth, and the ANCYL calls 
for a greater activism role for its members to install this new plan.101 
These policies from the ANCYL reflect the organization’s political stance, which leans to 
the left side of the political spectrum. Some of the policies, such as more opportunities for the 
young and poor, are predictable solutions and are for the good of all South Africans. Other 
points, such as calling for the nationalization of the mines, frighten many South Africans. It is on 
these more contentious points that Malema and Zuma disagree. These points have driven the 
wedge between the ANC and its youth branch, and these are the points that Malema continues 
to reiterate even after repeated warnings from the ANC.  
 
Malema & the End of the ANC’s Support 
Julius Malema’s continued stance on the nationalization of the mines and land reform 
has become a huge annoyance to the ANC in the past year. Although Malema had not been 
reprimanded for his hate speech trial, he continued to say things that reflected poorly upon the 
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ANC. Finally, when Malema made inappropriate statements on the governance of Botswana, 
insulted President Jacob Zuma by comparing him to Thabo Mbeki, and by making some 
questionable financial deals, he was found guilty by the ANC disciplinary committee of 
provoking divisions within the party and bringing the organization into disrepute.102 As 
punishment, Malema was suspended from participation in all ANC activities for a maximum of 
five years. Malema tried to file an appeal against this decision, but it was immediately denied. It 
seems that Malema finally went too far in his critique of the ANC. He has embarrassed the party 
diplomatically by his negative remarks on Botswana and his professed admiration for 
Zimbabwe’s governance under Robert Mugabe. His issues with President Zuma seem to have 
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Chapter Four: “Malema Rising” 
 
 Julius Sello Malema personifies the three issues that face the ANC today-- a vacuum of 
leadership, service non-delivery, and a restless youth. Malema has used his position as the 
leader of the ANCYL to gain media attention as well as a considerable grassroots base of 
dedicated followers. For every fan of Malema, there are many who dislike him and his policies; 
his name invites scorn and mockery from many segments of the citizenry—especially elites. 
Malema brings out interesting reactions in South Africans—they either love him or they hate 
him, but either way, there is a demand for constant updates about him.  
Today, Malema is credited with instigating trouble for the ANC by making some 
unflattering and negative comments as well as by inciting the South African masses to insist 
upon the redistribution of wealth alluded to by the 1994 Freedom Charter. Such behavior by a 
public figure disturbs many and the question on everyone’s minds is—Is Julius Malema a 
legitimate political figure? Should South Africans be warily respectful of the 31 year old quasi-
celebrity or should he be classified as a pretender to the ANC’s hard-won inheritance? This 
question arose not in 2008, when Malema first came into the spotlight as an outspoken Zuma 
supporter, but instead in June 2011, when Malema was re-elected President of the ANCYL in an 
uncontested race. In this election, the entire country witnessed Malema’s popular draw and the 
almost fanatical dedication of his base. After noticing Malema’s considerable star appeal, South 
Africans began to monitor his career, hypothesizing that someday he would become a 
significant presence in the ANC. 
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Malema did become a major figure in the politics of the ANC, but not in the way that his 
followers predicted. Instead of continuing as a dedicated Zuma supporter, Malema has begun 
to make a name for himself by manipulating the political divisions within the ANC and fanning 
the flames of dissatisfaction within the young and poor. This behavior has most recently earned 
Julius Malema expulsion from the ANC—the party that has played a major role in creating and 
accelerating his political career. Recent events such as the expulsion and subsequent 
denouncement by onetime allies of Malema have thrown a shadow on the fiery young man’s 
political future, but the immense popularity of his personality and his politics still merit close 
watching. 
 Julius Malema’s life story certainly reflects the experiences of the majority of South 
Africans—it is partially his modest upbringing that endears the youth leader to his admirers. 
Malema was born March 3, 1981 to a single mother, Florah Malema, in Sheshego, part of the 
Limpopo province in northeast South Africa (Limpopo is one of the poorest provinces in South 
Africa). Florah Malema lived in a township home with her mother, son and several siblings 
while working as a maid in wealthier household. Florah had three children in her lifetime, two 
girls and a boy, but Julius was her only child who lived past the age of three.103 Julius Malema 
proclaims that he has never met his father; he was raised only by his mother’s side of the 
family. Julius had a difficult childhood, his mother worked long hours and he spent most of the 
time living with his grandmother in what would be considered extreme poverty. Oftentimes, 
Julius felt compelled to knock on neighbor’s doors just to find something to eat.104 At night, 
Malema slept on the floor because there was not enough sleeping space in the house for all of 
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the Malemas. In school, Malema received a substandard elementary education; the Apartheid 
system formally ended when he was 13, so many of his most formative years were spent in an 
oppressive and racist atmosphere. Malema was not particularly enamored of academics—his 
circumstances made him more likely to desire day-to-day survival than to look ahead to an 
uncertain future. Recent publications of Malema’s matriculation results, in which his highest 
grade earned was in woodshop, reflect this attitude.105 After school, young Malema would 
collect cans for money to supplement his family’s income. Many members of the ANCYL 
leader’s former neighborhood are quick to remember that Malema never resorted to stealing, 
unlike many other boys in his situation.   
 This portrait of childhood is unfortunately very common in South Africa; these are the 
conditions that many modern children still struggle with--even after the end of Apartheid. The 
unemployment rate hovers around 23 percent, which keeps average South African families like 
Julius Malema’s without a steady income to provide financial stability.106 These modest roots 
give Malema a prominent place in the hearts and minds of many South Africans. Historically, 
the majority of South African leaders did not have such modest upbringings—this was one of 
the reasons that Zuma was so popular in the campaign against Mbeki. Even Mandela came 
from a respectably middle class background with a calm and loving home life. One must 
remember that a great number of South Africans live on grants as small as $50 a month and are 
very familiar with life in poverty. To them, Malema embodies that struggle, and he has 
overcome that life using his wits and his ambition. Malema symbolizes a new type of leader, 
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one who knows what it is really like to live in poverty. These people are proud of Malema-- he is 
a symbol of success amidst overwhelming odds. 
 Julius Malema became involved with the ANC very early in his life, during the effort to 
fight Apartheid. At the age of nine, Malema joined the “Young Pioneers,” a youth segment of 
the ANC.107 Soon after, Malema began training in the use of firearms and participated in other 
militant activities such as assembling Molotov cocktails for use against Apartheid forces.108 
Malema’s career within the ANC moved quite quickly after the eradication of Apartheid in 
1994—first, he was voted the regional president of the ANCYL. In 2001, Malema was made 
national head of the Congress of South African Students (COSA). During this time, Malema also 
attended school irregularly and dabbled in local business deals to supplement his small salary. 
Malema often comments that from an early age, the ANC defined his life, it was all he had—he 
was drawn only toward politics. The examples that Malema gives as well as the depth of his 
involvement with the ANC certainly demonstrate that Malema felt a strong connection to the 
ANC from an early age.  
 Malema illustrated his passion for politics during Jacob Zuma’s rise to power. Prior to 
2008, Julius Malema was an obscure youth leader from Limpopo; after the highly publicized 
election, Malema became a South African household name. During Jacob Zuma’s campaign 
Malema stated that he would “kill for Zuma,” and embarrassed himself and the Zuma camp 
when he sang the hateful Apartheid song, “Kill the Boer” at a rally.109 Eventually, Malema was 
tried and acquitted for singing the song, and in the meantime he gained a few influential friends 
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such as Winnie Mandela and Jacob Zuma. Malema felt free to make anti-white comments and 
to call for the redistribution of wealth during this time. Malema’s allies in the ANC did not 
necessarily agree with him but they also did not move to stop him. It seemed that while Julius 
Malema’s controversial actions upset many--he could do no wrong as far as the ANC was 
concerned. During occasions of hate speech, racial slurs, politically insensitive comments and 
outright attacks at political opponents from Malema, the leadership of the ANC simply ignored 
his behavior. This behavior worried many moderate South Africans about the ANC’s motives in 
supporting Malema. They wondered: Does the ANC secretly agree with Malema’s rants? Even 
when Malema’s newfound wealth and the legitimacy of its origins came into question, the ANC 
said nothing.110 Instead, he was shielded by the ANC’s proposed secrecy policies. Somehow, 
corruption charges against Malema were dropped, just like his hate speech charges. To 
outsiders, it seemed that the ANC silently approved of this behavior, but it was a matter of time 
until Malema’s unbridled attitude would take him beyond the ANC’s tolerance.  
 In the past two years, Malema has abused the ANC’s tolerance too many times . The 
political party has finally begun to take action against its youth leader, but not for the reasons 
that everyone expected. Malema is not in trouble because of hate speech or for attacking 
journalists and rival politicians-- Malema is in trouble because he attacked his old ally, Jacob 
Zuma. During a speech to the ANC’s National Executive Committee in February 2012, the youth 
leader clearly outlined his political intentions to the ANC’s ruling body—intentions that the ANC 
would disagree with. During his speech, Malema reiterated his policy of “Economic Freedom in 
Our Lifetime,” a play on Nelson Mandela’s famous philosophy of “Freedom in Our Lifetime.” In 
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his address, Malema calmly discussed the historical importance of the ANCYL within the ANC 
and his hope that this importance would only grow with time. Malema took his discourse a step 
further, however, when he began to discuss the need for defending ideals within the Freedom 
Charter by nationalizing mines, banks, and other important industries.111 Malema demanded 
that research on the possibility of nationalization in South Africa be discussed openly within the 
ANC. The ANC on the other hand, has said publically that the nationalization of the will never 
become an issue.  
The uneasiness between the ANCYL President and the elites in the ANC escalated when 
Malema began to openly criticize Jacob Zuma’s political policies by blaming current problems 
such as the lack of housing and unemployment on “this generation” of politicians.112 In another 
public setting, Malema compared Zuma’s governing style to that of Thabo Mbeki, the president 
that the nation had so famously tired of in 2006.113 In yet another widely publicized speech to 
students at the University of Witwatersrand, Malema said,  
“...It is under President Zuma that we have seen the youth of the ANC being traumatized, being 
expelled from their own home. It is under President Zuma we have seen a critical voice being 
suppressed… We have seen under President Zuma, democracy being replaced with dictatorship. 
We have seen an intolerance...people, who become impatient with the youth.”114 
 
Through these utterances, Malema has turned Zuma into an enemy of the poor youth, a point 
which is potentially dangerous in a youth-dominated country during an election year. Although 
it is obvious by the demonstrations and the attitudes of the masses that they desire more 
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change than what Zuma has given them, Malema did not count on the power that Zuma holds 
as Secretary General of the ANC. These actions and the power that Zuma holds would later 
come back to haunt Malema.  
After publically criticizing Zuma, Malema also flaunted his support for Robert Mugabe’s 
regime in Zimbabwe during a trip to that country in 2010. The discussion he attended was on 
on “indigenization”-- the nationalization of white Zimbabweans’ farmlands and the 
redistribution of those lands into black African ownership.115  Malema wore a t-shirt with 
Mugabe’s portrait on it for the entire trip, and was heard vocally praising the Zimbabwean 
leader. The ANC was put in a difficult situation because of Malema’s visit, as South Africa had 
been attempting to broker a fragile peace between the Zimbabwean dictator and the ZANU-PF, 
Mugabe’s political opposition within the country. Malema’s attempt at changing the direction 
of the ANC’s foreign policy did not endear him to the leadership of the party. For his Zimbabwe 
incident, Malema was fined and accused of “bringing the ANC and the government into 
disrepute.116” This was the first incident wherein Malema’s actions were punished specifically 
by the leadership of the ANC. It later became obvious that Malema did not take these 
punishments seriously because he continued to comment unfavorably on the ANC’s foreign 
policy in Libya, Swaziland, Cote d’Ivoire, and the widespread dangers of “re-enforcing British 
and American imperialism,” by maintaining close relations to the West.117 
                                                 
115
 “Malema’s Political Timeline.” The Zimbabwe Mail. February 29, 2012 
http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/world/10759-malema-s-political-timeline.html Accessed 3-23-2012 
116
 Ibid.  
117





In another attempt to drive the ANC in his favored direction after the Zimbabwe 
conflict, Malema publically called for a change of political leadership in neighboring Botswana 
and commented that Ian Khama, the country’s president, was a “puppet” of the United States 
and of Western ideals.118 He added that Botswana’s governing style in relation to the West was 
a threat to Africa as a whole.119 This comment especially angered the ANC, partially because of 
the anti-Western sentiment and because Botswana is a major ally of South Africa’s. A few days 
later, Malema apologized for his remarks, probably as a result of the ANC’s prompting. Malema 
expressed hope that the ANC would forgive him for youthful mistakes stemming from his 
political fervor.  
 Malema’s comments on Botswana turned out to be the final straw for the leadership of 
the ANC. Because of his comments on Botswana and his thinly veiled criticisms and accusations 
in regard to President Jacob Zuma’s leadership, Malema was brought to trial and accused of 
“sowing divisions” within the party and again of bringing the party into disrepute.120 This time, 
Malema was not simply given a fine. In August 2011, Malema was tried by the ANC in 
Johannesburg for his crimes against the party; during the trial massive crowds gathered outside 
and became violent and vocally supportive of the youth league leader. The court moved to 
dismiss Malema from the ANC for five years.121 Malema promptly apologized for his behavior 
and the embarrassment it brought to the ANC, and then filed for an appeal.  
 Malema hoped that the appeal would mean that he was no longer dismissed from the 
ANC, but he lost his gamble. Instead, the court ruled that Malema be expelled from the ANC 
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altogether, because he had "reneg(ed) on his membership oath and (was) not prepared to 
respect the ANC’s constitution.122" Later, on April 4th, 2012, the ANC National Disciplinary 
Committee (NDC) announced that Malema would not be expelled from the ANC, only 
temporarily suspended, on the prescribed conditions that Malema, 
“1. …will not exercise any duty in his capacity as an ANC member, President of the ANC Youth 
League and/or Member of the Provincial Executive Committee of the ANC Limpopo Province;  
2. He will not attend any meeting of the ANC or any of its structures, including the Leagues, 
except for the purpose of the NDCA hearing and the pending disciplinary proceedings to be 
instituted against him. 
3. He will not address any meeting of the ANC or any of its structures, including the Leagues, 
whether as an invited guest, in his capacity as President of the ANC Youth League and/or as a 
member of the ANC; 4. He will not make any public statement on any matter pertaining to the 
ANC.”123 
 
For Malema, a man who clearly enjoys public appearances as well as wielding the considerable 
power that his position as President of the ANCYL gives him, this is a harsh punishment. For a 
man who has spent nearly his entire life involved with the ANC, to be suspended from the 
party’s meetings, structures, and any public discussion of the party is a harsh punishment 
indeed.  
 Malema has already illustrated to the world that he does not plan to heed the 
conditions put forth by the NDC. On April 6, 2012, Good Friday, Malema was invited to speak at 
two churches in the Eastern Cape. At the Last Hope Church in Butterworth, South Africa, 
Malema was quoted as saying, “I will never be silenced. There is nobody who has a right to 
silence me. The right to speak was given to me from the day I was born.”124 This comes as no 
surprise to those who understand Malema’s personality; his ego could simply not handle being 
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silenced because he feels that what he has to say is important. What does come as a surprise 
was Malema’s testimony in the church in which he explained that he was undergoing “personal 
hardship” and asked churchgoers and the bishop to pray for him, because “those that used to 
be our friends have turned against us. They have not only turned against us but plan our death. 
You have an obligation, bishop, that what they plan for does not succeed.”125 In a recent 
announcement on his all too famous twitter account, Malema posted “Suspension, expulsion, 
now I get threats of treason should I attack country president in my personal capacity.[sic]”126 
Perhaps Malema does indeed feel certain reservations about his sensitive position within the 
ANC--or he is attempting to win the sympathy of his fans with this humble and vulnerable 
attitude. So far, there has been no evidence to suggest that Malema’s life is actually threatened 
by any of his former allies. As another rebuke to his enemies via social media, Malema tweeted, 
“Let easter remind you of what happens to those you think are dead & buried. [sic]”127 
 Malema is fighting back against his punishment, which he feels is silencing his voice. 
Certain factions within the ANC have good reason to silence Malema, as he has already openly 
criticized the Secretary General during an election year. It was previously understood that 
Zuma’s reelection would be easy, but with Malema around it may not be so simple. Zuma has 
much to lose if Malema remains a credible figure within the party. Although many reporters 
have asked Malema what his plan of action is should he be expelled from the ANC as well as his 
position as ANCYL President, Malema does not seem to have concrete answers yet. Instead, 
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Malema hopes that the youth-driven movement that he has begun will gain momentum, and 
that his hopes for “Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime” will be realized with or without him.  
 
Malema’s Future 
 After his successful reelection as president of the ANCYL, Julius Malema was branded as 
the “ANC’s future” or as the “South African President in Waiting.128” In 2011, Malema was 
named as one of the top ten most powerful men in Africa by Forbes magazine.129 Malema was 
considered unstoppable by his supporters, and he made his detractors very nervous, especially 
on the topics of land reform and the nationalization of South African mines. But this was before 
Malema began to challenge Zuma, the man he helped gain power.  
 Throughout this piece, the meteoric rise of Jacob Zuma through the restlessness of the 
youth and the growing sentiment against Thabo Mbeki in the ANC has been described in detail. 
The most important lesson to take away from the 2007 example is the fact that Jacob Zuma 
himself encouraged this rift in the ANC; Zuma encouraged South Africans to stand up against a 
leader that they no longer felt was necessary and to dispose of him through democratic 
methods. In doing so, Jacob Zuma has created a problem for himself, and Julius Malema has 
stepped in to exploit this. Since Zuma has paved the way of sowing divisions within the ANC in 
order to democratically replace a disappointing leader; he has made it much easier for any 
leader of the ANC to be supplanted by another. It is now apparent that Malema plans to rally 
against Jacob Zuma in the 2012 ANC general election. Malema understands that the majority of 
the South African population is dissatisfied with the direction in which the country is moving; he 
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is the ANCYL President, it is his job to understand the mindset of the youth (which 
coincidentally makes up the majority of the country.) Malema has reacted to this in a way that 
some could call selfish—he has harnessed this dissatisfaction to make himself more famous, 
more politically powerful. On the other hand, Malema’s motivations could truly be in favor of 
the people he has spent his life with, the people his career has depended on—the poor black 
majority. Either way, Julius Malema has considerable grassroots support with the youth in 
South Africa, even if he is not currently accepted by the ANC. On the next page, statistical data 
from the US Census Bureau made into population pyramids is used to show how much of the 
population Malema can count on for support if he continues to ally himself with the youth. As 
was said previously, South Africa has a massive population of young people, and this group is 
also the most effected by unemployment. The charts do a better job of explaining Malema’s 
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Jacob Zuma knows that Malema has the potential and the desire to topple him. This is 
one of the reasons that Malema presently finds himself so heavily persecuted by the elites of 
the ANC. The entirety of the ANC will come together during December 2012 in Manguang to 
hold their election conference. At the conference the next Secretary General of the ANC will be 
decided and if the ANC wins the general elections the following year--which seems highly likely 
considering the party holds a two thirds majority in most national elections--the winner of the 
elections in Manguang will be the next President of South Africa. Since Jacob Zuma has only 
served one term in office, he is still eligible for another term. Zuma wants this term, but 
Malema does not want him to succeed.  
 Malema weakened his political career by making it known that he does not support his 
former ally for another term as President. Jacob Zuma on the other hand, hurt his own political 
career by allowing Julius Malema’s actions to go unpunished for so long and then punishing him 
after he had won the hearts of many South Africans. If Malema had simply been pushed out of 
the spotlight after the first accusations of hate speech, Zuma would not face this dilemma. 
Instead, the problems began when Malema compared Zuma’s policies and governing style to 
that of Thabo Mbeki, his deposed predecessor.130 These type of verbal attacks continued until 
Malema was presented with the knowledge that he was to be tried by the ANC for his 
comments on Botswana as well as his comments on Zuma. This did not restrain Malema, 
instead in a recent speech in the Northern Cape, Malema alluded to Zuma, saying that some 
leaders become drunk on power and that they became too confident thinking that they going 
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to have power for a long time.131 Malema went on to encourage the crowd of 3000 ANC 
members to think about nationalizing the mines, which had been outlined in the country’s 1994 
Freedom Charter.132 The youth leader chastised unnamed elites in the party for being too close 
with mine owners and for being too close with big business. Finally, Malema went on to say 
that Mandela, the party’s biggest hero, never would have expelled a youth league member for 
reminding the party of its responsibility to its people; Mandela knew that young people needed 
to be guided with a wise and steady hand.133 This speech turned members of the ANC’s 
attention back to the teachings laid down in the more leftist portions of the Freedom Charter. 
This example is what organizations like COSATU and the ANCYL wanted Jacob Zuma to fulfill 
when they helped him to win the position as Secretary General of the ANC. This is the 
resounding theme in the battles for the heart and soul of the ANC. But, last time a leader won 
the highest seat in the ANC that seemed willing to make these changes in the interest of the 
poor and jobless, he was instantly turned against this rhetoric. Even if Malema succeeds against 
the odds stacked against him, will this happen again? 
 Malema’s future, like all politicians’ futures in a democratic society, is highly 
unpredictable. His current alienation from the ANC could be temporary; his fan base seems 
loyal to his personality and his passions. On the other hand, Malema continues to cross the 
lines and defy the punishments that the ANC sets for him. To his benefit, Malema also still holds 
strong ties with influential ANC members, such as provincial premier Cassel Mathale, and South 
African Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe. Both of these men, Malema’s closest allies, 
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belong to his Pedi ethnic group, a minority amongst African ethnicities in diverse South Africa. 
Motlanthe and Mathale have also emerged as opponents to the potential of a second term for 
Zuma, and if Zuma is not reelected, they could become even more powerful in the next 
administration. By becoming more powerful themselves, these men could also help to advance 
Malema’s political career. Malema means to support Motlanthe in a bid against Zuma in 2012 
along with the ANCYL. The continued support of these men combined with continued 
enthusiasm for Malema’s leadership from the ANCYL show the public that the fight is not over 
for Malema’s potential political career. But, if Zuma emerges as the victor of this particular 
battle, it seems highly unlikely that he will ever invite Malema back into his inner circle. 
Ironically, the success of Malema’s political career depends on the failure of the same man who 
helped him to succeed in the beginning.  
 
What Does Julius Malema Signify? 
 This piece serves to illustrate the various elements of dissatisfaction in modern South 
Africa. Julius Malema is the lens with which to highlight these elements. Those elements are the 
issues within the ANC’s top leadership, problems with service delivery, and the restlessness of 
the youth. These elements would be problematic on their own, but when combined they create 
circumstances for a populist figure such as Julius Malema to emerge.  
 Who is Julius Malema? He is a man who is unafraid to be politically incorrect. He is an 
incredibly polarizing figure in South African politics because he feels free to address painful 
issues in South Africa’s recent history, such as racism and inequality. South Africa is known as a 
miracle because of its unwillingness to face the unresolved tensions of the past between its 
64 
 
citizenry, but Malema’s aim is to attack this delicate peace. Malema scares people, especially 
South Africans with something to lose. This discord he has encouraged discourages foreign 
investment and causes another wave of racial strife. For those South Africans simply trying to 
survive, Malema speaks the truth; he puts words to all of their unspoken frustrations and 
questions for the first time the system that keeps them down. Many of his critics say that 
Malema is not genuine, if he is ever actually given real power he will live comfortably and 
become complacent like many of his “revolutionary” predecessors; the temptation would prove 
too difficult to overcome. This type of outcome depends on how truly connected Malema is to 
his followers--no one can answer question that but Malema himself.  
 What does Malema represent in politics? Many of his detractors brand him as a 
populist, a demagogue, a political entrepreneur, and most of all a liability.134 Others brand him 
as a hero, the voice of his generation. Who is correct? Has Malema begun a movement in South 
Africa with his persuasive personality and his fearless dialogue? Or, have the issues that South 
Africa now faces--dangerous issues--created him? Is Malema the true leader of a youthful 
revolution, or is he merely a product of his generation? South African academic Achille 
Mbembe felt the need to define Malema’s place by observing that “Malema embodies both the 
passions and contradictions of post-struggle politics and the dark and troubling undercurrents 
of a long South African tradition of lumpen radicalism.”135 In this way, Malema has become 
both a catalyst for social revolution and the product of it.  
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 The murmurings of social revolution stirring in South Africa are too vast and widespread 
to be a result of the efforts of a single man. Malema is not the single explanation for  
widespread frustration. On the other hand, without Malema South Africa’s political landscape 
would not be the same. Malema has become a symbol for people to rally behind; he is a breath 
of fresh air in comparison to the long-established institutions and dignified leaders that the ANC 




















“You can arrest me, but you can't arrest my ideas.” –Julius Malema 
 
 Julius Malema’s political future at this point is hanging by a thread. If Jacob Zuma is to 
win a second term as Secretary General of the ANC, and predictably, as President of South 
Africa then Julius Malema will be expelled from the party and forgotten. This can be inferred 
from the intense tension between the two men. Malema and Zuma have both insulted one 
another publicly, and the ANC leadership conference of 2012 will allow for these tensions to 
come to a head. Only one man will come out of that conference with his political career intact, 
and it is impossible to predict which it will be.  
 So, if Zuma is to win this fight, Malema will be forced to separate from the party he has 
worked for all his life. If Malema were to go off on his own to begin a movement or a party, he 
will probably not cause much trouble for the ANC. Yes, that sort of action from Malema would 
be newsworthy, and there is no doubt that he would have a substantive base, but the ANC still 
holds a two thirds majority in South Africa, and that type of power cannot be ignored. Malema 
would do well to remember the lessons of COPE—the ANC is simply too powerful, and unless 
he was able to lure the entirety of the South African Youth over to his side, he would be unable 
to make an impact against the political Goliath that is the ANC. Malema would fade into the 
background as a youth organizer who sometimes causes trouble, but without the ANC’s 
protection, Malema would also be much less likely to do something that could land him in 
court---or in jail.  
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 On the other hand, what if Malema emerged as the victor at the end of 2012? That 
would change everything. Malema would certainly not be nominated to be Secretary General at 
this time, but one of his older allies within the party would be. Malema could perhaps regain his 
position as ANCYL President, or he could find another position within the ANC if it suited him. If 
Zuma were not to win a second term as President, many doors would remain open to Julius 
Malema in South African politics. 
 This does not necessarily mean that Malema’s views would be embraced. Malema 
would not be welcomed into a policymaking position because of his volatile background and his 
desire to nationalize the country’s mines. He would remain a political celebrity for some time, 
until he could prove his loyalty to the ANC’s bottom line. If Malema were to remain a populist, a 
political entrepreneur, then his career would be limited to that role—he would be given no real 
power.  
 Malema does not seem to want that type of role. Yes, he loves fame, but there are 
many different types of fame in the world of politics. Right now, Malema is practically 
infamous; he is a running joke for commentators and the media. If Malema were to embrace 
the ANC’s preferred methods, perhaps he could gain more respect, and become a famous 
leader rather than remain a ridiculed public figure. 
 Malema is only 32 years old. Perhaps, as he ages he will become complacent. He already 
demonstrates a love of wealth; he only wears Breitling watches, a brand that runs upwards of 
$5000 per watch.136 He has also been spotted in various imported luxury vehicles and owns 
several homes in South Africa. It is difficult to uphold this type of lifestyle on the salary of a 
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revolutionary. In order to suit his own tastes, Malema may turn to the most expedient way to 
please himself and those closest to him; he could easily forget those who he speaks for now.  
 There is much fear within the foreign investment community in regard to Malema’s 
potential as a South African political leader. These investors should not fear Malema—by the 
time that he is given real power by the elites of the ANC, he will have learned that his disturbing 
rhetoric of nationalization and redistribution are not effective in a globalized, neo-liberal 
society. These ideals belong to a young man; in 20 years Malema will have gained the wisdom 
and restraint that are the hallmarks of all good leaders.  
 The one glimmer of hope in Malema’s future is if he actually does gain power, and if he 
actually does gain the power to create policy, hopefully he will remember his base. Malema’s 
past seems very important to him; hopefully it is more important to him than it was to Zuma. If 
Malema were to gain real power, maybe he would finally use that power to actively fight 
poverty in South Africa. This type of healing does not need to come in the form of a 
redistributive economic framework, but in the creation of jobs for the young and restless 
population. This type of healing could come in the form of equal education for all, in the form 
of economic stability caused by wise political choices. Malema can still be used as an 
instrument for change, but this change can happen peacefully.  
 Throughout this piece, I have highlighted the most controversial events in both 
President Zuma and Malema’s political careers. In doing so, I hoped to point out the similarities 
between the two figures. They are both incredibly charismatic figures who remain popular with 
the majority of South Africans. Zuma and Malema were both raised in abject poverty and 
became a part of the ANC in their most formative years. Both men have also encountered 
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significant obstacles on their way to power in the form of lawsuits and allegations. These legal 
struggles came as a result of each man’s behavior behind closed doors—neither man can seem 
to act with caution and moderation, as befits a politician. Now, a battle exists between these 
two very similar figures to unseat one another from positions of importance within the ANC. It 
is interesting that it has come to this—a mentor fighting his protégé for power. In the long 
term, it will be fascinating to see how deeply the similarities run between Zuma and Malema—
especially if Malema succeeds in displacing Zuma from the Presidency.   
 Malema is still incredibly young to be mired in the world of politics. Over the past two or 
three years, he has matured considerably. He is no longer the man at the rally singing “Kill the 
Boer” and shouting obscenities at reporters that ask him the hard questions. Instead, he has 
begun to restrain himself more, to make wise choices that reflect well upon his personality and 
his intelligence. He appears after the disciplinary hearings with the ANC to be more reserved. 
He is still unafraid of a fight, but he picks his battles much more wisely, and he has learned to 
win them with a whisper instead of a shout. Malema is not an educated man, but he is an 
intelligent one, and those who do not recognize that are in for a surprise. After working directly 
with the masses and the media for two years, he has learned to speak to people’s hearts. In the 
future, Malema could be a formidable force in the South African political landscape, not only as 
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